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1 Introduction 
Evidence for anthropogenic warming of the climate sys-
tem as a consequence of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
including CO2 (carbon dioxide), into the earth’s atmos-
phere is unequivocal (IPPC, 2007a). Annual CO2 emissions 
from deforestation in tropical and sub-tropical countries 
accounts for up to a fifth of global emissions, the second 
largest source of all GHG emissions (Baumert et al., 2005). 
It also makes up more than a third of developing countries’ 
emissions. Conserving carbon stored in biomass could be a 
cost-effective strategy to mitigate future climate change 
impacts (see Stern, 2007; Chomitz et al., 2006). Reducing 
emissions from deforestation was, however, excluded 
from the climate change regime that resulted from the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations held during the 1990s. The 
first commitment period of Kyoto is due to end in 2012. At 
the Bali Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2007, 
countries agreed to create a mechanism for ‘reducing 
emissions from deforestation and degradation’ (REDD)
3 as 
a potential component of a post-2012 climate change 
regime (UNFCCC, 2007). 
 
More precise rules and modalities are to be developed by 
COP-15, which is due to take place in Copenhagen, in De-
cember 2009. Many open questions remain on how reduc-
ing deforestation could be credibly incorporated into a 
climate regime. There is therefore a need to take stock and 
consider the merits of such a mitigation strategy and how 
it might be implemented on the ground. This is the moti-
vation for the edited volume, Avoided Deforestation: Pros-
pects for Mitigating Climate Change, which assesses the 
potential of REDD mechanisms from the perspective of 
economics and policy-making (Palmer and Engel, 2009). 
Due to be published by Routledge in March 2009, this 
volume highlights the importance of avoided deforesta-
tion as part of a global strategy to mitigate the build-up of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in to the earth’s atmos-
phere. Incorporating deforestation could provide an open-
ing for the active participation of developing countries in 
emission reduction efforts under an international climate 
change regime (Dutschke and Wolf, 2007). 
 
This paper aims to introduce the role of forests in mitigat-
ing climate change and summarise some of the key issues 
and research covered in Palmer and Engel (2009). Section 2 
presents the climate change problem, the role of forests 
and the policy debate so far. Section 3 focuses on research 
to assess the cost-effectiveness of avoided deforestation 
as a strategy to mitigate climate change, while section 4 
examines the barriers to the adoption of such a strategy, 
primarily those related to policy and institutions. Section 5 
looks at policy design, with a focus on overcoming addi-
tionality and leakage constraints and maximising the 
efficiency and effectiveness of potential avoided deforesta-
tion schemes. The main findings are analysed alongside 
some further issues for discussion in section 6. It should be 
noted upfront, however, that providing a full review of 
related literature is beyond the scope of this paper
4. Excel-
lent studies are constantly adding to the existing body of 
knowledge relevant for REDD policy design. Section 7 con-
c l u d e s  b y  a d d r e s s i n g  s o m e  o f  t h e  k e y ,  r e m a i n i n g  o p e n  
questions along with suggestions for future research. 
 3 
2  Forests, climate change and avoided deforestation 
According to widely-cited data published by the World 
Resources Institute (see Baumert et al., 2005), global an-
thropogenic GHG emissions, dominated by CO2, are mainly 
given off via the burning of fossil fuels, and from agricul-
ture and land-use changes. Emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation occur as carbon stock is depleted 
and released to the atmosphere through changes in forest 
and other woody biomass stock, forest and grass land 
conversion, the abandonment of managed land, and forest 
fires. A 20 per cent decrease in forest area since 1850 has 
contributed to 90 per cent of emissions from land-use 
changes (IPPC, 2001). Throughout the 1990s around 1.5 
billion tons of carbon (GtC) was released annually through 
deforestation (Gullison et al., 2007). Two countries, Indo-
nesia and Brazil, dominate CO2 emissions released through 
deforestation and as a result are, respectively, the third 
and fourth largest GHG emitters in the world, behind the 
United States and China (Houghton, 2003; cited in 
Baumert et al., 2005). 
 
2.1  Impacts of climate change 
Anthropogenic interference in the climate system is a real 
and growing threat to people, economies and the envi-
ronment (Chomitz et al., 2006). On current trends, the 
average global temperature could rise by 2–3 ˚C within the 
next 50 years. This rise is likely to rapidly change the 
earth’s climate, for example, leading to rising sea levels 
and a higher frequency of heat waves and heavy precipita-
tion (IPPC, 2007a). Business-as-usual or ‘baseline’ climate 
change implies increasingly severe economic impacts if 
action is not taken to mitigate the worse effects. 
 
Climate change can perhaps be characterized as the 
worlds largest ‘market failure’ (Stern, 2007). The earth’s 
atmosphere, into which anthropogenic GHG are emitted, 
is a global public good, i.e. it is non-rival and non-
excludable. These emissions are an externality in that 
those who produce them impose social costs on the world 
and future generations but do not face the full conse-
quences of their actions. The actual source of emissions, 
whether producer or consumer, rich or poor, is irrelevant to 
the overall growth in global GHG stocks and the corre-
sponding future changes in the climate. Nevertheless, the 
worst impacts of climate change are expected to fall dis-
proportionately on people living in some of the poorest 
regions of the world. People living in these regions are the 
most vulnerable to adverse changes in, for example, food 
production and water resources. 
 
2.2  Climate change policy 
The global causes and consequences of climate change 
imply the need for international collective action for an 
efficient, effective and equitable policy response. The first 
global attempt to put a price on the social costs of emis-
sions by stabilizing the amount of GHG in the atmosphere 
was seen in the formation of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Ratified by 
182 Parties as of May 2008 (UNFCCC, 2008), the Kyoto 
Protocol of the UNFCCC originally entered into force in 
2005. It committed Annex I, mainly industrialized coun-
tries to reducing their collective GHG emissions by about 
five per cent below their 1990 levels by 2008-2012. In fulfill-
ing these commitments, countries are able to achieve 
reductions in their emissions through several mechanisms 
including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
CDM allows entities in non-Annex I countries to develop 
‘offset’ projects leading to verified reductions in GHG 
emissions emitted from Annex I countries. So-called Certi-
fied Emissions Reductions (CERs) are then transferred to 
Annex I countries at a price set by the carbon markets. 
 
Reducing GHG emissions in order to stabilize the climate 
requires the deployment of a portfolio of GHG emissions-
reducing technologies along with the application of ap-
propriate and effective incentives (IPCC, 2007). These in-
clude adaptation and mitigation measures such as carbon Engel & Palmer – “Painting the forest REDD?” Prospects for mitigating climate change through reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
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storage and capture and reducing deforestation, all with 
varying, generally uncertain costs. None of these measures 
on their own, for example, the halting of all deforestation, 
would achieve the UNFCCC’s goal (Pacala and Socolow, 
2004). But conserving forest carbon could likely be an 
important part of the climate change solution, particularly 
if it proves to be cost-effective compared to other mitiga-
tion options (see Stern, 2007; Chomitz et al., 2006). Nego-
tiations on the types of admissible projects in Kyoto in-
cluded a range of options for increasing forest stock and 
removing carbon from the atmosphere. Reducing emis-
sions from deforestation was discussed, but was finally 
excluded from the CDM (see below). 
 
2.3  Forests as carbon  
sources and sinks 
The Forest Resources Assessment (FAO, 2006), estimated 
that a third of the earth’s land surface, up to four billion 
hectares, is covered by forest. Of this, around half is located 
in the tropics and sub-tropics. The largest intact tropical 
forests are found in the Amazon Basin (Brazil), the Congo 
Basin (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in the Indo-
Malayan region (Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New 
Guinea). These forests provide important traded and non-
traded environmental goods and services, including car-
bon. Tropical forests have particularly high carbon stocks, 
perhaps holding as much as 50 per cent more carbon per 
hectare than forests in other regions (Houghton, 2005). In 
terms of economic value, even relatively low traded carbon 
values have been found to comfortably dominate the non-
market values of other tropical forest environmental serv-
ices (see Pearce et al., 2002). These include direct use val-
ues, although perhaps excluding the returns from unsus-
tainable timber extraction. 
 
Over the past century, tropical deforestation and forest 
degradation have increased dramatically. The former oc-
curred at an average rate of 13 million hectares per year, 
between 1990 and 2005 (FAO, 2001; 2006). Brazil and 
Indonesia accounted for, on average, around 40 per cent of 
annual deforestation by area over this period. The causes 
of the continuing loss and degradation of tropical forests 
are many, varied and complex (Chomitz et al., 2006; Geist 
and Lambin, 2002; Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). How-
ever, understanding these is important for the design and 
implementation of policy to reverse their effects, whether 
related to policy to reduce CO2 emissions or not. This re-
quires identifying the underlying market and policy fail-
ures and understanding how these relate to activities both 
inside and outside the forest sector. The latter include 
those related to agriculture, migration and infrastructural 
development. Recent government and non-government 
efforts to slow down or reverse overall deforestation and 
degradation trends, either through forest policy or policy 
made in other sectors have been relatively unsuccessful for 
various reasons (see Bulte and Engel, 2006). Given the 
many inter-linked pressures on forests, the challenge now 
for climate policy is to design a strategy for capturing the 
carbon value of natural forest stock that is not only effec-
tive but also efficient and equitable. 
 
2.4  Avoided deforestation and  
climate change policy 
Without effective policies to slow deforestation, business-
as-usual tropical deforestation could release up to 130 GtC 
by 2100 (Houghton, 2005). ‘Avoided deforestation’ is a 
concept where countries are compensated for preventing 
deforestation that would otherwise occur (Chomitz et al., 
2006). Reducing emissions by slowing deforestation could 
be a substantial and important component of climate 
mitigation policy, and has been discussed as such by re-
searchers and policy-makers for a number of years (see, for 
example, Brown et al., 1996; Schneider, 1998). The available 
evidence shows that potential carbon savings from slow-
ing tropical deforestation could contribute substantially to 
overall emissions reductions. Moreover, forests protected 
from deforestation could persist in the coming decades 
despite ‘unavoidable’ climate change (Gullison et al., 
2007). Possible side benefits from the realization of natural 
forest carbon values include other forest environmental 
values such as biodiversity. 
 
Avoided deforestation projects were excluded from the 
2008-12 first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
CDM due to a number of concerns revolving around sover-
eignty and methodological issues (Fearnside, 2001; 
Laurance, 2007). The former arose as a consequence of 
forests per se not being considered as a global public good 
despite the public good nature of some forests services. 
Since exclusion, discussions have been ongoing to try to Forests, climate change and avoided deforestation 
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resolve these concerns through, for example, the 
UNFCCC’s recent 2-year initiative (Subsidiary Body on Sci-
entific and Technical Advice or SBSTA). This has acted as a 
useful forum for assessing new policy approaches and 
incentives for avoided deforestation in developing coun-
tries. Note that the SBATA process included discussions 
about emissions from forest degradation, thus expanding 
the scope of potential policy mechanisms from RED (Re-
ducing Emissions from Deforestation, or avoided defores-
tation) to REDD. Meanwhile tropical forest nations such as 
Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica and Brazil have been float-
ing various initiatives to protect forests through utilizing 
their value as carbon sinks.
5 Forest carbon finance has also 
been endorsed by the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
the majority of nation states, with the Bank’s Forest Car-
bon Partnership Facility (FCPF) aiming to attract US$ 300 
million in donor funding for pilot REDD schemes (World 
Bank Carbon Finance Unit, 2008). With support from Aus-
tralia, Indonesia is hoping to be the first country to develop 
and host a REDD project, beginning in late 2008 (Jakarta 
Post, 2008). 
 
The Bali COP is part of an ongoing process that will carry 
on through 2008. It is hoped that a post-2012 international 
climate regime will be agreed by the end of 2009 at COP-15 
in Copenhagen. Whether or not avoided deforestation or 
REDD will be included in a final framework agreement and 
what this arrangement might look like is beyond the scope 
of this paper
6. Instead, and for the most part, it looks at 
what might be gained from including REDD as a feasible 
option in a post-Kyoto agreement and at how some of the 
challenges of such inclusion could be tackled from the 
perspective of economics and policy-making. The following 
three sections, respectively, investigate the cost-
effectiveness of avoiding deforestation or REDD, the policy 
and institutional barriers to implementing REDD and some 
insights for effective and efficient REDD policy. 
 6 
3  The cost-effectiveness of avoiding deforestation 
Different approaches have been employed by researchers 
to estimate the costs of avoiding deforestation. In general, 
because avoiding deforestation involves a change in land 
use, opportunity costs (i.e., the costs of foregone net bene-
fits from the next best alternative activity) tend to consti-
tute the most important source of costs. Building on back-
ground research carried out for the Stern Review (Stern, 
2007), Grieg-Gran (2009) examines the cost-effectiveness 
of avoided deforestation as a mitigation option using 
empirical data for eight tropical countries. Her estimates of 
average opportunity costs per tonne of CO2 avoided range 
from US$1.2 to 6.7, depending on the scenario under con-
sideration. Grieg-Gran also highlights the spatial variation 
in cost estimates across countries. While perhaps ‘cheap’ 
in say parts of Africa, avoided deforestation may turn out 
to be less cost-effective in Indonesia, depending on land 
use. Additionally, Grieg-Gran incorporates administration 
costs into her estimates. These particular transactions 
costs range from US$0.1 to US$0.2 per tonne of CO2. Aver-
age cost estimates overall compare favourably with most 
other mitigation options, although higher transactions 
costs could potentially account for a substantial propor-
tion of the total cost per tonne of CO2 avoided through 
reducing deforestation
7. 
Combating deforestation will, of course, still require sub-
stantial funds. Rametsteiner et al.. (2009) develop a global 
land use model, which indicates that a 50 per cent reduc-
tion of carbon emissions from deforestation over the next 
20 years would require financial resources of some US$33 
billion per year. This is a figure that easily exceeds all cur-
rent annual Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
spending on forestry. Given that ODA alone would fall 
short of funding requirements, a combination of funding 
sources and policy mechanisms would be required for 
reducing emissions from avoiding deforestation. Carbon 
trading, now active in various forms all over the world, 
could be one potential component of funding. Using a 
global timber market model, Sohngen (2009) confirms the 
conclusion that carbon credits for reductions in deforesta-
tion may be cheap in comparison to other options both in 
forestry, e.g. afforestation, and in the energy market. In a 
related study, Tavoni et al.. (2007), found that reductions in 
deforestation can achieve levels of annual sequestration 
similar to those achieved with carbon capture and storage 
but earlier and at lower prices. These studies
8 highlight the 
need to include avoided deforestation or REDD as a mitiga-
tion option in global climate change models. Currently, 
these models often ignore this option. 
 7 
4  Policy and institutional barriers 
There are a number of important policy, institutional and 
methodological barriers that prevented the inclusion of 
REDD strategies in the Kyoto Protocol, although progress 
has been made since to overcome these (Johns and Schla-
madinger, 2009). It seems that the most contentious issue 
relates to the financing of REDD activities. The challenge is 
to provide adequate, consistent, long-term funding of 
REDD activities, while also providing real and additional 
climate benefit. Developing countries have been arguing 
strongly that financial assistance for REDD should not be 
drawn from existing development-funding streams. 
 
Current proposals mostly fall into one of three categories: 
(i) trading REDD credits in the carbon market (similar to 
CDM Afforestation/Reforestation credits); (ii) a voluntary, 
fund-based approach not linked to the carbon market; and 
(iii) indirect market approaches, drawing proceeds from 
the market but without a direct link to market credits. 
Hybrid approaches appear promising, in that they could 
capture the larger financing potential of the market while 
benefiting from advantages of a fund, such as allowing for 
equity and biodiversity considerations in targeting. Alter-
native or complementary funding could be obtained 
through a tax on Kyoto mechanisms and/or on emissions 
from international air and maritime transport or through 
an obligatory contribution by Annex I countries to a revolv-
ing compliance fund (Dutschke and Wolf, 2007). Another 
issue is whether a REDD mechanism should follow a CDM-
type project-based approach, a national approach, or a 
‘nested’ approach. A strong argument for a national ap-
proach relates to the issue of ‘leakage’, i.e., the possibility 
that REDD in one area may be at least partially offset by 
increases in deforestation and degradation elsewhere. 
While international leakage can still occur under a national 
approach, it could be addressed in different and separate 
ways compared to the leakage that might occur at the sub-
national project scale (see section 5). 
 
Significant progress has been made in identifying and 
analysing the large range of drivers of deforestation at 
varying spatial scales (Chomitz et al., 2006). It is clear that 
any feasible REDD mechanism needs to be built on an 
understanding of these drivers and be flexible enough to 
support solutions tailored to specific local and regional 
conditions. A limited capability to monitor deforestation 
and estimate forest-based emissions has long been an-
other barrier to the inclusion of REDD in an international 
climate regime. Recent advances in the field of remote 
sensing in combination with appropriate ground truthing 
provide a solid basis, as described both in Johns and 
Schlamadinger (2009) and by Moutinho et al. (2009). The 
remaining uncertainties can be treated by taking lower-
bound estimates of the quantity of emissions reduced. Yet 
improvement in access to data and training in new tech-
nologies is still required. The degree to which forest degra-
dation and forest regrowth are to be considered as activi-
ties included in a REDD mechanism is another crucial issue 
still to be resolved. While there are good reasons to include 
both activities, the difficulty and increased cost involved in 
emission monitoring and estimation poses a real chal-
lenge. Baseline setting, i.e. the estimation of rates of 
change in say deforestation rates or emissions levels in the 
absence of policies to change these, is another highly po-
litical issue, which is discussed in further detail below. 
 
Institutional barriers, while they have not been the centre 
of negotiations thus far, have now increasingly become a 
focus of attention and discussion, as countries, NGOs, and 
financing institutions grapple with the so-called ‘readiness 
process’. This is supposed to ascertain what it will take for 
a country to be ready to participate in an international 
REDD mechanism (Dutschke, 2008). Institutional barriers 
include, e.g., appropriate land tenure and forest protection 
law; adequate capacity for monitoring and enforcement; 
and effective engagement of civil society, including forest-
dependent and indigenous communities. 
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Moutinho et al. (2009) along with Palmer and Obidzinski 
(2009) discuss some of the above issues as they relate to 
the two main contributors of CO2 emissions from forestry 
and land use changes in the world: Brazil and Indonesia, 
respectively. In addition to illustrating some of the coun-
try-specific policy and institutional challenges in more 
detail, these researchers highlight the fact that REDD re-
quires a coordination between different levels of govern-
ance of the implementing country (from local to national) 
as well as across different sectors of the economy. Policy 
reforms and initiatives are ongoing in both countries that 
would go hand-in-hand with an international mechanism.  
 
Moreover, the important point is made that pressures on 
forests, whether in the absence or presence of an effective 
REDD mechanism, are likely to increase. Increases in agri-
cultural product prices such as biofuels, exchange rates 
effects and road construction may all enhance pressure on 
forests, yet are often ignored in baseline estimation. In 
Indonesia the situation is particularly dramatic as growing 
demand for timber products and biofuels have driven 
Indonesian government plans for a massive expansion of 
these sectors. This expansion is supported through sub-
stantial government subsidies including the use of timber 
stands as collateral in plantation development. These have 
the effect of reducing deforesters’ costs with implications 
for the estimation of deforestation baselines. Palmer and 
Obidzinski (2009) draw attention to the potential that the 
prospect of an international REDD mechanism may induce 
perverse incentives, by slowing the reforms necessary to 
correct government failures, in order to achieve higher 
baselines. This may, however, be more of an issue with the 
adoption of a business-as-usual baseline projection rather 
than one drawn from a historical reference period. In Bra-
zil, land speculation and ‘land grabs’ by prospective land-
owners, and driven by agricultural commodities’ and live-
stock prices, have long dominated deforestation behaviour 
at the Amazon frontier. Property rights claims underlying 
such behaviour raises similar baseline issues as in Indone-
sia but may also present opportunities in the context of a 
REDD payment regime, as discussed further below in sec-
tion 6. 
 
Michaelowa and Dutschke (2009) pick up on one of the 
major concerns related to including REDD credits in the 
carbon market: the fear that the potentially large supply of 
carbon credits from reducing emissions through avoiding 
deforestation could upset the balance of the market. The 
authors estimate and project expected credit supply and 
market demand scenarios for carbon until 2020. Their 
supply analysis incorporates governance problems plagu-
ing most countries with high deforestation rates, while 
d e m a n d  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t r i n g e n c y  o f  t h e  
climate policy regime. They find that, due to governance 
problems in many tropical countries, the credit supply 
from REDD would pick up slowly during the initial years of 
programme implementation. Nevertheless, any integra-
tion of credits from reducing emissions through avoiding 
deforestation into the carbon market should be accompa-
nied by long-term target setting.  9 
5  Insights for effective and efficient REDD policy 
This section addresses the issues of leakage estimation, 
baseline setting, dealing with tradeoffs in objectives, and 
increasing the efficiency of current mechanisms compen-
sating for avoided deforestation. 
 
Murray (2009) focuses on the importance of recognizing, 
estimating, and where possible ameliorating the risks of 
leakage from compensation policies that are likely to be 
applied to a subset of countries with deforestation poten-
tial. He illustrates some of the different approaches that 
can be used to estimate leakage empirically and of the 
relatively small number of studies that have attempted to 
do so to date. The results of these studies suggest that 
international leakage from avoided deforestation policies 
could be substantial if not addressed in policy design. One 
way to reduce leakage is to expand the scope of policy 
coverage as wide as feasible. Scope expansion could in-
volve covering more countries or more activities. 
 
However, an important point made by Murray is that ex-
panding the number of countries involved in a voluntary 
system involves the balancing act of enhancing incentives 
for their participation through, among other things, gen-
erous baselines against the need to maintain the environ-
mental integrity of the system by not crediting ‘hot air’. 
Expanding the scope beyond deforestation may both help 
lure countries with low baseline deforestation rates into 
the system and ensures that deforestation emissions are 
not reduced at the expense of carbon losses elsewhere in 
the forest sector. Covering all forest carbon in an interna-
tional compensation system raise, however, some con-
cerns about spurring land use changes that could poten-
tially undermine other environmental objectives such as 
biodiversity and water provision unless addressed via 
agreed-upon protocols, e.g. discouraging the conversion of 
native ecosystems to plantations.  
 
As mentioned above, one crucial issue for any REDD 
mechanism is the setting of the hypothetical baseline (or 
business-as-usual projection) against which REDD pro-
gress is measured. A baseline for forest conservation has 
two main components: the projected land-use change and 
the corresponding carbon stocks in applicable pools in 
vegetation and soil. For the latter, there are now standard 
values recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) for different vegetation types that 
can be used (Dutschke and Wolf, 2007). The most com-
monly discussed method for baseline estimation is the use 
of some sort of national historical reference period of 
emissions from deforestation. Alternative, more sophisti-
cated approaches have been proposed, as described both 
by Johns and Schlamadinger (2009), and Murray (2009). 
These include more or less sophisticated projections of 
past trends into the future or a normative baseline. 
 
Harris et al. (2009) emphasize the need for a standardized, 
scalable baseline approach that is accurate, transparent, 
credible and conservative. They briefly review three specific 
models for baseline estimation applied elsewhere and 
evaluate how they differ in terms of transparency, accu-
racy and precision, applicability at various scales, compati-
bility with international requirements, and cost-
effectiveness in terms of data, time, and expertise needed 
for application. They then describe in detail a spatial mod-
elling approach that ranked highest in their evaluation. 
The so-called GEOMOD approach is interesting because it 
can be used to estimate a deforestation baseline at the 
project, regional or national scale and to predict the spatial 
location of deforestation. A weakness of the approach is 
that estimated overall rates of deforestation are based 
purely on historic rates, while driving factors are used to 
predict location only. Such weaknesses, however, need to 
be considered in light of the overriding need for setting the 
most objective, transparent and comparable REDD stan-
dards possible at the international level. 
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Pfaff and Robalino (2009) further demonstrate the impor-
tance of correct baseline estimations. They explain how 
impact evaluation and policy planning are complicated by 
several factors: the inability to observe how land choices 
would have differed without a policy; the fact that policy 
location may be affected by private and public choices; and 
the spatial and temporal interactions among land use 
choices. Using empirical examples from Costa Rican poli-
cies, specifically the widely-cited payments for environ-
mental services (PES) policy and Costa Rican parks and 
protected areas, the authors convey how impact analysis 
could address these hurdles. Pfaff and Robalino’s results 
also show that forest conservation policies that appeared 
to have been very successful at first sight may have added 
m uc h  l e s s  in  th e  w ay  o f  co ns e r va t i on  b en e f i t s  on c e  th e 
appropriate baselines are considered. In other words, once 
policy impacts were evaluated in a thorough manner, 
conservation policy resulted in much lower levels of ‘addi-
tionality’ than was originally expected. These results have 
two important implications for REDD. First, they cast doubt 
on very simplistic baseline approaches, e.g. those based on 
simple historic deforestation data. Second, they highlight 
the need for more efficiency in conservation spending.  
 
Finding ways to increase the efficiency of forest conserva-
tion spending, whether at the international, national or 
sub-national level, is important for several reasons. First, 
the actual cost of REDD will depend on how efficiently 
available funding is used, which in turn depends on the 
d e s i g n  o f  a  f u t u r e  R E D D  m e c h a n i s m .  I f  R E D D  i s  t o  b e  
achieved through the establishment of some type of inter-
national fund like the Amazon Fund
9, the fact that finan-
cial sources are limited requires a procedure for deciding 
which countries, regions or projects are selected for REDD 
funding. Moreover, increasing the efficiency of current 
forest conservation spending can be seen as an important 
complement to a strategy of raising additional funds for 
reducing carbon emissions through avoided deforestation. 
As argued by Engel et al. (2009) in work on funds’ target-
ing in Costa Rica’s PES scheme, demonstrating efficiency 
can be important in attracting new funding sources, par-
ticularly from the private sector. By increasing the effi-
ciency of existing programmes, funds can be freed up for 
additional programmes, or for inclusion of additional sites 
in a given programme (‘achieving more bang for the buck’). 
 
Both increasing cost-effectiveness of funding and dealing 
with institutional or policy-related barriers on the ground 
requires a careful consideration of policy choice and policy 
design. There are a variety of policies that could be applied 
to avoided deforestation from so-called ‘command and 
control’ instruments such as state protected areas to ones 
based on a market mechanism (see Gupta et al., 2007). 
Policy choice may depend on a number of factors including 
the source(s) of market failure and in the particular case of 
deforestation, the identification and level of understand-
ing of the drivers and agents of deforestation (Engel et al., 
2008). 
 
PES, the focus of both Engel et al. (2009) and Alix-Garcia et 
al. (2009), are an increasingly used instrument both for 
financing and implementing forest conservation and thus 
have potential in application to payments for REDD. The 
relevance of PES to the REDD debate is demonstrated by 
cost studies such as Grieg-Gran (2009), which tend to 
assume that some type of PES will be put in place to com-
pensate land owners (or land users) for the profits forgone 
by avoiding deforestation. The defining characteristic of 
PES lies in its conditionality (Wunder, 2005): payments are 
made by an environmental service buyer conditional on 
the environmental services provided by an environmental 
service seller. Such ‘beneficiary pays’ positive incentives 
h a v e  n o t  o n l y  b e e n  s h o w n  t o  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  m o r e  c o s t -
effective compared to more indirect conservation ap-
proaches (see Ferraro and Kiss, 2002) but may also be 
politically more acceptable than instruments such as taxes 
on forest products or land clearance
10. 
 
The Costa Rican national PES scheme is often considered a 
pioneer and leading model of PES. Payments there are 
made largely for avoided deforestation, although as shown 
by Pfaff and Robalino (2009), these have not had the im-
pact on deforestation rates claimed by the scheme’s pro-
ponents. In establishing a national or regional PES scheme, 
questions arise on how land parcels are selected for pro-
gramme inclusion, and about the size and allocation of 
conservation payments. Voluntary PES projects within a 
country could lead to the leakage of emissions to non-
enrolled parcels. While national accounting may capture 
this, there will still be efficiency issues, which could be at 
least partially dealt with through improved payments 
targeting. Engel et al. (2009) show that the amount of 
environmental services achieved with a given budget for a Insights for effective and efficient REDD policy 
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region in Costa Rica could be nearly doubled through im-
proved targeting in site selection. In particular, they de-
velop a tool for selecting among applicant sites on the 
basis of three criteria: the amount of environmental serv-
ices provided by the site; the probability that these services 
would be lost in the absence of PES (additionality); and the 
cost to land owners of providing the services. Alix-Garcia et 
al. (2009) find similar efficiency gains when targeting is 
considered for the national PES scheme in Mexico. 
 
Engel et al. (2009) along with Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) both 
deal with issues related to national-level schemes
11. The 
lessons drawn from these chapters can also, to some ex-
tent, be applied to international-level mechanisms. The 
CDM is an example of an international PES scheme. One of 
the main declared objectives of the World Bank’s prototype 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is to test a system 
of performance-based incentive payments for REDD serv-
ices. There is considerable spatial variation in the carbon 
content of forests. Moreover, a fund-type REDD mecha-
nism may also want to consider additional environmental 
services like biodiversity conservation, or equity argu-
ments, all of which can in principle be integrated as target-
ing criteria for PES, as demonstrated by Engel et al. (2009). 
Threat levels and opportunity costs may vary even more in 
space. Some of the methods presented elsewhere in 
Palmer and Engel (2009) could be applied here; e.g., the 
estimation of location specific deforestation baselines à la 
Harris et al. (2009). Engel et al. (2009) and Alix-Garcia et al. 
(2009) also discuss scientific, administrative and political 
challenges of targeting and how these may be overcome. 
Such challenges may be even greater at the international 
level. Efficiency gains need to be weighed against political 
feasibility and increases in implementation costs. 12 
6 Discussion 
In this section, some further thoughts are presented relat-
ing to the role of REDD in climate change mitigation, per-
manence in REDD carbon benefits, the importance of in-
centives and avoiding ‘hot air’ credits, and governance. 
 
6.1  Role of REDD in global climate 
change mitigation 
There are several reasons why the inclusion of REDD, or at 
least RED (avoided deforestation), in an international cli-
mate regime should be considered as part of a portfolio of 
mitigation options alongside an agreement containing 
stringent curbs in global GHG emissions. 
 
First, as demonstrated by Michaelowa and Dutschke 
(2009), modest emissions reduction targets imply that in 
the mid-term a glut of REDD credits may lead to low car-
bon prices that remain low. Cheap prices for combating 
climate change while intuitively a good thing for climate 
policy (see Chomitz et al., 2006) may dampen incentives 
for more long-term investments in other mitigation op-
tions such as improving energy efficiency (Kremen et al., 
2000; Schneider, 1998). This may have serious implications 
for long-run climate policy objectives, although techno-
logical change needs to be complemented with public 
investment in research and development as well as price 
incentives. For the worst predicted effects of climate 
change to be overcome, sharp curbs of perhaps up to 70-
80 per cent of current global emissions may be required 
(IPPC, 2007b)
12. In 2008, cuts of 50 per cent were agreed, in 
principle, by the Group of Eight (G8) at its annual meeting, 
which are expected to be achieved by 2050 (G8, 2008). 
Since deforestation accounts for around a fifth of current 
emissions, it is obvious that incentives will also be neces-
sary to ensure emissions reductions in other sectors, par-
ticularly energy production, transport, and industry, in 
order to realise ambitious global targets (IPPC, 2007b). A 
glut of REDD credits could potentially send out price sig-
nals that would not be sufficient to push producers and 
consumers towards a low-carbon economy over the com-
ing decades. On the other hand, today’s cheap REDD po-
tential may decrease with every year that it is not taken 
advantage of while the reduction of energy-related emis-
sions could become more accessible over time with tech-
nological advancement. It is possible, however, that uncer-
tainty about the supply of REDD credits, particularly in the 
early years of scheme implementation, might make it 
difficult to tune the supply-demand balance in a CDM or 
allowance type approach. 
 
Second, in the event of considerable global warming occur-
ring, there is a risk that forests, even if conserved by soci-
ety, may be severely damaged by climate change, which 
could trigger a chain reaction of forest die-off and carbon 
release that would be difficult to stop (see Nepstad et al., 
2008). Thus, an important point made by Chomitz et al. 
(2006) and emphasised by Michaelowa and Dutschke 
(2009) is that REDD credits can contribute most in a cli-
mate change mitigation scenario of high stringency. 
 
Third, the inclusion of REDD as a low-cost mitigation op-
tion may be needed in order to provide incentives to bring 
more emitters into a collective climate agreement post-
2012. Given the relative cost-effectiveness of REDD as 
compared to other mitigation options, including REDD (or 
at least RED) in a global strategy to combat climate change 
could increase the likelihood of both getting industrialized 
countries to agree to stricter targets (if REDD credits can be 
used to meet these targets) and getting developing coun-
tries on board as well. In this sense, the large potential 
magnitude of REDD credits may be seen as a hope rather 
than a concern (Chomitz et al., 2006). For example, devel-
oping countries inspired by the Brazilian government’s 
initiative (see Moutinho et al., 2009) are keen to see indus-
trialised countries reduce rather than simply offset their 
emissions elsewhere. While some major emitters such as 
those in the EU might agree with this position, others such 
as the US and Japan may like to see a larger role for emis-Discussion 
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sion offsets than is presently allowed under Kyoto. A com-
promise between the extreme ‘domestic reductions’ and 
‘offsetting’ positions may be the best hope of getting not 
just as many countries as possible to agree on a single 
climate regime but also one that commits the Parties to 
stringent emissions reductions. 
 
6.2 Permanence  in  REDD 
An issue that was only marginally addressed in Palmer and 
Engel (2009) and one that is closely related to the previous 
point is that of permanence, i.e., whether emissions from 
deforestation and degradation are reduced for good and 
not simply shifted to another period (Murray, 2009). A lack 
of permanence can, in principle, be viewed as a form of 
‘temporal leakage’, similar to spatial leakage discussed 
earlier. As forest systems interact with climate and hydro-
logical systems, unforeseen changes may occur including 
feedback effects and forest ‘die-back’. Moreover, local 
deforestation may vary with market conditions, leading to 
unexpected outcomes. For example, biofuel policies may 
increase the demand for arable soils, thereby increasing 
emissions from deforestation. The approach of temporary 
crediting applied under the CDM could also be an option 
for REDD. However, the flipside is that the market value of 
a temporary emission allowance can be very low, as it 
depends on price expectations for the subsequent com-
mitment period. Countries might thus prefer to take over 
liability for longer periods, while insurance could help 
reduce the risk of non-permanence in emissions reduc-
tions. The former point implies the need for institutions 
that would be able to hold countries to their long-term 
commitments. 
 
Most current proposals include a carry-over of commit-
ments to the subsequent commitment period in case 
deforestation has increased beyond the agreed upon level, 
combined with some obligatory banking of some share of 
the credits (Dutschke and Wolf, 2007). Averaging emission 
reductions over longer commitment periods, e.g., of ten 
years, would also help to deal with difficulties in predict-
ability (ibid). Within countries, incentive mechanisms like 
PES could be more directly linked to market prices. Even if a 
significant portion of REDD turns out to be non-permanent 
in the longer run, REDD may still serve an important role in 
bridging the time to a less CO2-intensive global economy 
(Lecocq and Chomitz, 2001)
13. The idea of ‘carbon rental’ 
may also get around the problem of locking-in certain land 
uses in perpetuity, which has been perceived by some 
countries as an infringement of sovereignty over their 
natural resources (Laurance, 2007). Moreover, the idea of 
perpetuity is simply not feasible in many developing coun-
tries given unstable political and economic conditions, all 
of which implies that at most REDD can create temporary 
carbon credits in these countries. 
 
6.3 Avoiding  ‘hot  air’ 
The issues of additionality, permanence, and leakage have 
been cornerstone concerns for project-based GHG mitiga-
t i o n  p o l i c y  ( M u r r a y ,  2 0 0 9 ) .  T h e  f e a r  i s  t h a t  R E D D  c o u l d  
become a feel-good market, achieving insignificant real 
emissions reduction (CIFOR, 2008). Indeed recent empirical 
evidence on the lack of additionality of existing forest 
conservation policies, some of which has been summa-
rised above, reinforces the need for solid baseline assess-
ment. As Harris et al. (2009) put it, the development of an 
accepted, standardized baseline approach for avoided 
deforestation activities is therefore a key step towards the 
a d o p t i o n  o f  a n y  f u t u r e  R E D D  m e c h a n i s m .  S u c h  a n  a p -
proach also needs to balance the gains from more accurate 
baseline estimates against the associated costs. A major 
challenge in this regard is to agree on a method that could 
effectively incentivize emissions reductions in high-
deforestation countries, while still supporting the mainte-
nance of forests that may be under more threat of defores-
tation or degradation in the future (Johns and Schlamad-
inger, 2009). Potential REDD mechanisms that can mini-
mise hot air at the international level should be given 
serious consideration, e.g. see Strassburg et al. (2008). 
 
Another important point made by Murray (2009) is the 
potential tradeoff between increasing additionality and 
decreasing leakage: the less stringent baselines are set, the 
greater the incentive for a large number of countries to 
participate in a REDD mechanism which will help control 
international leakage. There is also some urgency in agree-
ing on baselines. Palmer and Obidzinski (2009) clearly 
demonstrates the potential for perverse behaviour, with 
the adoption of a business-as-usual baseline approach 
leading to increased deforestation and reduced incentives 
for policy reform. A related issue, and one that may partly 
help to address the above challenges, is the optimal length 
of baseline projection. For example, Harris et al. (2009) Engel & Palmer – “Painting the forest REDD?” Prospects for mitigating climate change through reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
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propose a project length of 20-60 years, but with baselines 
‘locked in’ for 10 years only (see also, Sohngen, 2009). 
 
6.4  Changing results requires  
changing incentives 
The importance of incentives is stressed throughout 
Palmer and Engel (2009). It is important to acknowledge 
that at the local level deforestation is usually a profitable 
activity. To some degree this also holds at the country level 
as halting deforestation can imply forgone economic de-
velopment. Yet policy failures are also widespread at that 
level, resulting in above optimal deforestation rates even 
from the national perspective. A PES-type mechanism 
appears promising both at the international and the 
within-country level. Particularly, making incentives condi-
tional on actual REDD performance is an essential part of 
avoiding ‘hot air’. Paying nations contingently on their 
REDD performance also opens up options to leverage pol-
icy reforms (CIFOR, 2008). At the local level, bundling REDD 
with other environmental services like biodiversity conser-
vation or hydrological services may help raise additional 
funds for avoiding deforestation. Again, whether a na-
tional PES scheme is the best approach for individual coun-
tries in achieving compliance with national REDD com-
mitments will depend on the underlying sources of defor-
estation and on the governance system in place. For ex-
ample, where deforestation is driven by credit market 
imperfections or perverse incentives in other sectors, it 
would be preferable to address these issues directly (Engel 
et al., 2008). PES is likely to work best in a situation of 
secure property rights to forest lands and requires some 
basic quality of governance. This also holds, however, for 
other types of conservation policies.  
 
6.5 Governance  and  readiness 
Participating in an international REDD mechanism and 
setting up an effective and efficient local incentive system 
(whether through PES or other measures), is only possible 
if basic institutional prerequisites are satisfied. These in-
clude, for example, a system of secure and well-defined 
property rights over forest lands, the capacity to quantify 
forest inventories and assess future land use trends and 
related carbon flows, a functioning legal system, the ca-
pacity to monitor and enforce existing rules and regula-
tions, and the political will to establish new institutions for 
forest conservation. 
 
The FCPF explicitly aims to help countries build up the 
necessary capacity for participating in a REDD mechanism. 
About a third of the FCPF funding is earmarked to a so-
called ‘readiness fund’, which would: (i) help interested 
developing countries to arrive at a credible estimate of 
their national forest carbon stocks and sources of forest 
emissions; (ii) assist in defining their reference scenario 
based on past emission rates for future emissions esti-
mates; (iii) offer technical assistance in calculating oppor-
tunity costs of possible REDD interventions; and (iv) de-
signing an adapted REDD strategy that takes into account 
country priorities and constraints (World Bank Carbon 
Finance Unit, 2008). Such an approach appears promising 
to facilitate participation of least developed countries in a 
future REDD mechanism. Another approach is the estab-
lishment of bilateral forest partnerships between an An-
nex I Party and a developing country (Dutschke and Wolf, 
2007). 
 
While capacity-building is necessary, it should be acknowl-
edged that improvements in governance take time. In the 
meantime, prospective landowners, whether local com-
munities, government agencies or firms, are likely to con-
tinue to claim de facto (and sometimes de jure) property 
rights in remote and poorly-governed forest areas. Could 
such speculative behaviour, typically made in anticipation 
of earning future rents from the land, also occur in the 
context of a local REDD payments mechanism? And if so, 
would it matter? We might expect similar rent-seeking 
behaviour, although with a system of conditional pay-
ments, the ‘new’ forest owners would have incentives not 
to convert forest. They may even be expected to proac-
tively protect it. REDD payments could then potentially 
have a positive impact on the environment, particularly 
where there are weak, endogenous property rights (Engel 
and Palmer, 2008). Adding carbon values to landowners’ 
value of the standing forest may increase their ability to 
protect their de facto property rights against intrusion. 
Although this would to some extent deal with the open 
access problem of forests, there could be distributional 
problems if richer actors colonise forest areas at the ex-
pense of poorer ones. A nationally-administered, carefully-
targeted payments scheme could be one way around this 
problem (see Moutinho et al., 2009; Hall, 2008). 15 
7 Conclusions 
There appears to be a strong case for including REDD in a 
global climate change mitigation strategy post-Kyoto. 
Significant progress has been made in addressing previous 
concerns to such an inclusion. It is now time to synthesize 
approaches and develop an integrated REDD mechanism. 
The success of REDD will depend on the ability to show 
that it can be done. The establishment of the FCPF as a 
prototype for REDD measures as well as other current pilot 
activities have an important role to play in this regard. In 
doing so, it will be crucial that these initiatives incorporate 
the lessons from recent studies highlighting the complexi-
ties and weaknesses of existing forest conservation poli-
cies. Upscaling policies such as PES without improving on 
scheme additionality and cost-effectiveness could under-
mine the success of a performance-based incentive pay-
ment system for REDD services and raise costs of REDD 
beyond expectations. 
 
In focusing on REDD as a potential strategy for mitigating 
climate change, this paper has neglected some key ele-
ments of the climate change policy debate. First, adapta-
tion strategies have been ignored. It is clear that neither 
adaptation nor mitigation alone will avoid climate change 
impacts (IPPC, 2007b), and that forests play a crucial role in 
adaptation as well. Second, while potential mechanisms 
for including REDD in an international climate framework 
have been considered, the practical and legal arguments, 
for example, of whether to include REDD in an extension 
to the Kyoto Protocol or to create an entirely new Protocol 
altogether were not (see Forner et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 
2007). Related to this, the international political economy 
of REDD inclusion was only briefly touched upon when 
discussing the possible preferences of different nation 
states and the political trade-offs being made at the inter-
national level in fora such as the UN and G8. For example, 
recent US legislation considers a potentially important role 




REDD should, however, be viewed through a prism of scar-
city and trade-offs between competing uses for the world’s 
resources. With the world’s population forecast to reach 7-
11 billion by 2050 (United Nations, 2004), the global de-
mand for energy and food will continue to rise in the com-
ing decades. Ultimately, decisions over the allocation of 
natural resources will probably be political ones. At the 
very least, allocations based on economic criteria will be 
substantially affected by political forces. In this context, 
the introduction of REDD, or at the minimum, RED, should 
be seen as an opportunity to reverse deforestation trends 
and capture forest carbon values, but only as one, perhaps 
particularly cost-effective way of mitigating climate 
change. For it to work, it must remain competitive with 
other land uses. Other mitigation options also require 
further opportunities for development and implementa-
tion; avoided deforestation should not be allowed to stunt 
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Endnotes 
                                                                            
1 Much of the material in this paper is taken from Palmer and Engel (2009), with the publisher’s permission. An earlier version of 
Engel and Palmer (2009) benefited from comments and suggestions from Ken Chomitz, Michael Dutschke, Brian Murray and Sven 
Wunder. 
2 Authors are listed alphabetically 
3 ‘Avoided deforestation’ is otherwise known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED). Inclusion of forest degradation ex-
tends this definition to REDD. Both RED/avoided deforestation and REDD are covered in Palmer and Engel (2009) depending on the 
topic under discussion. 
4 For example, a recent overview of the issues can be seen in Dutschke and Wolf (2007). A discussion of avoided deforestation in the 
context of climate change and deforestation can be seen in the relevant chapters of Stern (2007) and Chomitz et al. (2006), respec-
tively. Policy-related issues alongside the legal and technical considerations of avoided deforestation are covered by Moutinho and 
Schwartzman (2005). See also Murdiyarso and Herawati (2005) for chapters relating to livelihood issues, in addition to those focus-
ing on the CDM and carbon sequestration from a bioscience perspective. International policy issues and how REDD might fit into 
climate policy from a practical perspective are covered by Streck et al. (2008). 
5 For example, at the COP-11 in Montreal in 2005, a coalition of 15 rainforest nations led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica floated 
a  p r o p o s a l  t o  a l l o w  C D M - t y p e  c r e d i t s ,  b o u g h t  b y  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n s ,  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  r e d u c i n g  d e f o r e s t a t i o n .  S e e :  
http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/eng/. 
6 The importance of international collaboration in solving the global collective action in climate change policy is reviewed in Gupta 
et al. (2007). The relative merits of Kyoto and alternative arrangements for international cooperation can be seen in Forner et al. 
(2006). 
7 Note, however, that the price of avoided deforestation as a mitigation option will be determined by the marginal cost and not the 
average cost. We expect there to be differences between the two depending on the shape of the marginal cost curve. 
8 Existing studies are too numerous to list here. For a good overview, see Richards and Stokes (2004). 
9 The Amazon Fund was launched by the Brazilian government in July 2008 with an initial donation of US$100 million from the 
Norwegian government (Economist, 2008). See: http://www.amazonfund.org/. 
10 A recent comparison of 15 PES or ‘PES-like’ systems around the world favourably reviews their conservation outcomes and effi-
ciency, thus providing a number of possible models for REDD (see Wunder et al., 2008). Nonetheless, PES, despite being a focus in 
this volume, is not a panacea for dealing with all environmental problems (see Engel et al., 2008). 
11 Alternatively, and instead of making direct payments to potential deforesters (assuming that they can be identified in the first 
place), any transfers received by a particular country say from an international fund like the FCPF could simply be invested in sys-
tems that discourage deforestation behaviour, e.g. for monitoring and enforcement. 
12 In order to stabilize the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at around 400-450 ppm (IPPC, 2007b). 
13 A time delay in emissions reduced by abatement measures could result in permanent climate benefits if the cumulative atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHG are lower at any future point in time (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008). 
14 The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008. See: www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf.   
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